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In the electricity sector, market participants must make decisions about 
capacity choice in a situation of radical uncertainty about future market conditions. 
Sector is characterized by non-storability and periodic and stochastic demand 
fluctuations. Capacity determination is a decision for the long term, whereas 
production is adjusted in the short run. Paper looks on the main contributions in 
investment planning under uncertainty, in particular in the electricity market for 
capital intensive investments like NPP. The relationship between market and non-
market factors (recent UK policy example) in determining investment signals in 
competitive electricity markets was analysed. Paper analyse the ability of 
competitive electricity markets to deliver the desired quantity and type of 
generation capacity and also investigates the variety of market imperfections 
operating in electricity generation and their impact on long-term dynamics for 
generation capacity. Paper analyses how price formation influences investment 
signals. Number of factors (including market power, wholesale price volatility, lack 
Ž. Tomšić, From market uncertainty to policy uncertainty for investment in power generation: real options for NPP on electricity market, Journal of 




of liquidity in the wholesale and financial market, policy and regulatory risks etc.) 
contribute to polluting the price signal and generating sub-optimal behaviour. 
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The recent high volatility in fuel markets, combined with environmental 
regulation policies, has introduced major uncertainties into the planning of 
generation capacity expansion. These uncertainties make generators' decisions to 
invest in new capacities more difficult. 
Volatile fuel prices, concerns about the security of energy supplies, and global 
climate change are coinciding to strengthen the case for building new nuclear power 
generation capacity.  
There is an emerging consensus that there is no obvious ‘‘silver bullet’’ for 
addressing the global energy and climate challenge - the solution will be comprised 
of a variety of technologies on both the supply and demand side of the energy 
system. In addition to energy efficiency and low-carbon renewable options, two 
technologies that could do much of the heavy lifting in the future are carbon capture 
and storage (CCS) and nuclear power (NP). However, the views on NP and its 
potential role in meeting the projected large absolute increase in global energy 
demand, while mitigating the risks of serious climate disruption, are highly 
divergent. Part of the continuing controversy is due to the large risks and 
uncertainties underlying the cost elements of NP and electricity market price. 
These risks and uncertainties are reflected in the wide range of cost estimates. The 
cost overruns and schedule delays of Finland’s new Olkiluoto plant and French 
Flamanville, are rekindling old fears about NP being far too complex and costly, and 
raising new questions about the viability of new nuclear plants, especially in 
deregulated electricity markets. Indeed, the costs of nuclear power stations (and 
large coal-fired power stations, particularly those with carbon capture and storage) 
remain uncertain. On the other hand, the fact that countries seem keen to build 
nuclear power stations suggests that their relative cost compared to low-carbon 
alternatives still seems attractive to at least some potential investors. 
Proponents argue that in relation to the objectives of electricity supply 
security, resource efficiency, and mitigating the threat of climate change, NP 
performs very well. NP represents a well-established technology for generating 
electricity that produces no carbon or other climate- relevant emissions; NPP is 
amenable to significant scaling-up and thus can provide large amounts of power; 
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deregulated electricity markets. Indeed, the costs of nuclear power stations (and 
large coal-fired power stations, particularly those with carbon capture and storage) 
remain uncertain. On the other hand, the fact that countries seem keen to build 
nuclear power stations suggests that their relative cost compared to low-carbon 
alternatives still seems attractive to at least some potential investors. 
Proponents argue that in relation to the objectives of electricity supply 
security, resource efficiency, and mitigating the threat of climate change, NP 
performs very well. NP represents a well-established technology for generating 
electricity that produces no carbon or other climate- relevant emissions; NPP is 
amenable to significant scaling-up and thus can provide large amounts of power; 
and NPPs uses a natural resource (uranium) with advanced technologies, it could 
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provide enough fuel to meet the world’s electricity needs for several centuries. 
Sceptics claim that NP is costly and technically complex. It involves the use of 
highly toxic materials that must be kept secure from attack or theft. Moreover, a 
viable technology for the permanent disposal or reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel 
has not yet been fully demonstrated. Finally, even in a carbon-constrained world, 
NP may be less economically attractive than a host of decentralized energy 
efficiency and distributed generation technologies. 
 
2 INVESTMENT AT ELECTRICITY MARKET  
In several industries, market participants must make decisions about 
capacity choice in a situation of radical uncertainty about future market conditions 
and decide on the level of output to be produced after the state of nature has 
unravelled. These industries are normally characterised by non–storability and 
periodic and stochastic demand fluctuations. In these cases capacity determination 
is a decision for the long term, whereas production is adjusted in the short run.  
In the electricity sector, generation must takes place just in time, and ought 
to ensure second by second supply demand balance, but capacities need to be 
installed well in advance, at times when companies face considerable demand and 
cost uncertainty when choosing their capacity. For electricity markets it is moreover 
well-known that demand fluctuates systematically over each day, month or year. It 
is natural to expect that companies try to anticipate those patterns when they make 
their investment decisions. Electricity generation is generally considered the typical 
example of an activity that is most effectively carried out by establishing a 
competitive market. 
But also investment in new power is essential for a well-functioning 
electricity market. Still, today decisions pertaining to investment in new capacity 
are surrounded by considerable uncertainties about the future economics of the 
projects. One reason is that in a deregulated market private investors typically 
have to bear a greater portion of the investment risk compared to a monopoly utility 
in a regulated market. This favours flexible investment alternatives with short-lead 
times and low capital requirements. Moreover, energy and climate policy – with 
feed-in tariffs for RES or green certificate system and the European emission 
trading systems for CO2 (EU ETS) - may add to investment uncertainties. Delayed 
and uncertain permitting processes also increase investors’ risks. 
 
3 SECURITY OF SUPPLY ON ELECTRICITY MARKETS 
Security of electric power supply become recently very important issue in 
energy policies but the adaptation of command and control rules that entailed a 
certain level of security of supply in the monopolistic context to a state of 
competition has not been trivial. It has represented the transition from a 
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(rather than reduction) in the level of complexity in the market structure and 
regulation.  
Matters related to security of supply can be defined in many different ways, 
and the term Security of Supply can mean different things in different countries 
and in a variety of contexts. It also includes a number of different concepts.  
Security of supply incorporates the sufficiency of supply sources and/or 
production capacity to meet peak demand at a reasonable cost (Supply Adequacy). It 
also includes the availability of flexible and reliable import, transmission and 
production capacity to deliver energy when and where it is required (Reliability). 
Finally, security of supply also takes into consideration the ability of the system to 
mitigate the risk of one or more sources of supply becoming restricted or very 
expensive (Diversity).  
The definitions that are used in the sector for issues related to Reliability and 
Security of supply [1].  
• Supply Adequacy is a measure of the capacity of the power system to serve 
the aggregate electric power and energy requirements of the customers 
within the quality standards (voltage limits and ratings) of the system and 
taking into consideration planned and unplanned outages of the system 
components.  
• Reliability of the system means in general, the ability to deliver at each point 
in time and at each location of the network, within a specified safety 
standard, the amount of power desired.  
• Security of supply covers a wide range of measures of power system ability to 
withstand sudden disturbances (such as electric short circuits or 
unanticipated losses of system components). Security of power supply is a 
complex concept that involves a number of actions necessary to guarantee 
system integrity. It includes supply adequacy, reliability and diversity.  
 
Figure 1 Security of power supply, Reliability, Supply Adequacy [2] 
3.1 Supply adequacy issues in electricity markets 
Investment decision under uncertainty in energy markets has attracted 
significant attention in recent years, and policy makers in many countries are 
debating whether competitive wholesale electricity markets are providing 
appropriate incentives to stimulate adequate investment in new generation 
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capacity. Looking at the evidence deriving from different markets shows that 
organised wholesale markets are currently failing to support investment in 
generation capacity, mainly because of the inefficiency of price signals during peak 
hours.  
One idea to solve this problem is Capacity payments that maybe will be able 
to restore efficient investment incentives. Some recent policy contributions 
highlight that policy intervention may have a significant effect on the quantity (and 
type) of additional capacity installed.  
Non-storability and the periodic fluctuation of demand and supply have a 
major impact on the economic behaviour of markets presenting these 
characteristics.  
In the last century, the electricity supply has been designed mainly in two 
variants:  
• A vertically integrated public monopoly; or 
• Different local monopolies for the distribution-retailing phase for small 
customers and a national company in the production-transportation phase, 
integrated by a long-term contractual relationship.  
The opening up of the network system imposes a new organisational style 
based on competition between producers. According to this new model there are 
phases in which competition is possible, and others characterised by monopolies. 
The distribution and transportation networks are considered natural monopolies, 
thus controlled by a regulating body that has to ensure access to every company, 
whereas the production and the selling (wholesale and retail) are free activities 
based on competition. With the liberalisation process of the electricity market, 
regulated monopolists have been transformed into competing companies.  
Competitive wholesale markets for electricity and energy often fail to provide 
adequate net revenues to attract investment in generation to meet reliability 
criteria. In addition, it is also argued that short-term price volatility is more 
extreme and frequent than in other commodity markets, because storage for 
electricity is too costly for commercial application. 
Lastly, another factor that is considered crucial when evaluating the 
adequacy of new capacity investment is the possibility, for the policy makers, to 
change market rules and market institutions. 
Impacts to investment decision can be market based and policy based risk 
factors. 
Impacts of typical market based factors to electricity investment are:  
i) large variations in demand over the year;  
ii) the need to balance physically the supply and demand and supply at 
every point of the network;  
iii) non-storability of electric power;  
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iv) inability to control power flows to most individual consumers;  
v) limited use of real time pricing by retail consumers;  
vi) necessity to rely on non-price mechanism (blackouts) to ration 
imbalances, because markets cannot clear quickly enough to do so.  
In this context in order to make sure that an economic signal (price of the 
electric power and ancillary services) reaches the market it should exist mechanism 
which is able to make consumers' preferences explicit to suppliers. 
Policy based risk factors are those related to the various forms that policy 
intervention may take in energy markets in order to minimise the effects of the 
specific features of the energy market on consumers. It is possible to distinguish 
between “ordinary” market uncertainties and uncertainties that are induced by 
policies. Market and other external uncertainties such as fluctuations in fuel prices 
and reservoir levels can to some degree be perceived as easier to manage than the 
uncertainties that stem from various policies. However, policy uncertainty either 
encourages investors to adopt a - wait and see strategy or increases the risk 
premium they require on their investments. Both can increase costs for consumers 
by pushing up market prices. At the same time environmental policies may require 
additional investments to meet tighter standards, or for some capacity to close.  
The problem is particularly acute for investments such as nuclear, carbon 
capture and storage (CCS) and renewables that rely not on a tangible commodity 
that consumers need (energy), but on markets created by government to reflect 
benefits to society (carbon reduction). They typically consist in price restrictions, 
regulatory uncertainty and regulatory intervention.  
- Price restrictions - A price cap is sometimes required to protect consumers 
against excessive prices in times of scarcity. This is normally a regulatory 
intervention with high distorting power when it comes to investment 
decisions because it is difficult to determine the optimal level of an efficient 
price cap. As a consequence it is typical to have a long-run average shortage 
of capacity and too little reliability in most electricity system.  
- Regulatory uncertainty – Investment risk is significantly affected by 
regulatory intervention. These factors are considered among the main 
drivers for inadequate generation capacity. Policies intervention may cause 
prices in electricity not to raise high enough to support new investments, 
particularly because regulators will be unwilling to allow prices to spike 
during periods of system tightness due to concerns surrounding market 
power. 
 
4 THE IMPACT OF LIBERALIZATION OF MARKETS ON INVESTMENT 
CHOICES IN NUCLEAR POWER 
Since future investments in nuclear power generation capacity will be made 
within this new market context, it is interesting to see the impact of this 
modification on investments choices made by electricity producers. In particular it 
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is question if electricity generators who will have chosen this production means will 
continue to prefer large capacity units as they did in the past, to optimize the 
benefit of the size effect and thus enjoy attractive production costs, or if the 
uncertainty related to the competitiveness of electricity markets will encourage 
them to choose smaller units to reduce the risk. In other words, how to choose 
between the flexibility of the modular investment and the efficiency of the high 
capacity unit due to increase in economy of scale? 
Intuitively, the solution offered by modular power plants would appear to be 
most suitable for a competitive environment with strong uncertainties about the 
supply and the price of electricity. Because of the irreversibility of the investment 
in the high capacity unit, it is optimal for the producer to invest only if the 
market price of electricity is high enough compared to the cost of electricity. The 
option of making sequential decisions when several medium sized nuclear modules 
are used enables the producer to be more aggressive in its investment strategy by 
initiating the construction of the first unit at a smaller critical price of electricity. 
The presence of uncertainties of future returns and costs are amongst the 
more critical factors affecting the willingness to invest.  
In the context of a liberalized market environment, investment in power 
generation comprises a large and diverse set of risks. These business risks include 
[3]: 
- factors that influence the demand for electricity and impact the supply of 
capital and labour; 
- regulatory controls (economic and non-economic) and political risks that 
generally affect revenues, costs, and financing conditions; 
- price and volume risks in the electricity market; 
- fuel price and supply risks; and 
- risks arising from the financing of investment. 
The presence of uncertainties of future returns and costs are amongst the 
more critical factors affecting the willingness to invest. There is however little 
consensus in the economic literature on how and to what extent policy 
uncertainty connected to carbon pricing specifically (e.g., emissions trading 
schemes) will affect investment behaviour in the power sector suggests that 
climate policy will not add any significant uncertainties for electricity investors in 
the future, and even stimulate firms’ investment incentives, at least if the policy is 
consistent over a longer time period. The main obstacle for investors is instead the 
fuel price. Thus, it is important to analyse how the implementation of a specific 
policy affects the behaviour of the investor.  
4.1 Market uncertainty and NPP 
The actual competitiveness of NPP must be analysed in a wider perspective. 
It cannot only rely on the analysis of greenhouse gas emissions; since nuclear is a 
very complex and expensive technology and many more aspects come into play. 
The liberalization of electricity markets shows that the fate of nuclear is strongly 
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affected by energy market structure. The loss of some main favourable 
conditions (governmental support, certainty of demand, a price regime based on 
recovering the production cost increase by charging higher prices to consumers, 
etc.), lead to a drop of the number of nuclear plants built from 1990 to 2005 to only 
1.7 nuclear plants per year (mainly in developing countries) compared to 17 
nuclear plants per year built in the period 1970-1990. In liberalized electricity 
markets decisions about energy technologies are driven by the expected returns, 
taking into account the risks (afforded by the company, rather than by consumers 
as in a monopoly regime) linked to costs and revenues. Moreover, nuclear energy 
has to face new competitors such as renewable source technologies, characterized by 
a lower carbon content, better environmental footprint, increased population 
acceptance and higher growth rates favoured by cost reduction driven by 
technological innovation. 
 
5 ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL RISKS OF NUCLEAR POWER 
From a strictly economic point of view three main risk factors are must be 
considered: (a) construction time, (b) investment costs and (c) variability of 
operating costs. Most of the existing plants have been built under a monopolistic 
regime, with governmental guarantees and controlled market prices, low capital 
costs and low investment risk. The investment risk, and the capital cost 
increased with deregulation of energy markets and were charged to electrical 
companies, penalizing capital intensive investments projects with long time 
return on investment and low technological flexibility [4]. Instead, investments in 
alternative power sources, like combined cycle gas turbine plants and smaller 
renewable plants have been favoured [5]. In such a context, investments on 
nuclear sector became uncertain and very variable. Considering a large size 
nuclear plant (1000-1600 MW), construction costs are up to 10 or 15 times higher 
than those required for the construction of a natural gas plant (100-700 MW). The 
projected costs also tend to increase due to the extension of construction time (cost 
overruns). Finally, costs for nuclear plants decommissioning are estimated as 
about 25% of the original investment costs. The total costs of a nuclear plant can 
be split into about 60-75% fixed costs (capital repayments, interest allowed, 
decommissioning costs) and 25-40% variable costs (for instance, the cost of 
uranium and labour). Unlike gas and carbon plants, the share of nuclear fuel cost 
on total production costs is small.  
While the cost of electricity uncertainty factors related to security aspects, 
licensing, escalation of decommissioning costs, radioactive wastes disposal, might 
contribute to increase the financial risk perceived from private investors and, 
consequently, the level of expected return. Rogner and Langlois [6] highlight that 
the future of nuclear power depends on the competitiveness strategies that 
industries, supported by technological innovation, will adopt to guarantee the 
economic and financial sustainability and reduce the safety risks. Such targets 
require strong political support to the nuclear industry. For instance, the 
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problems related to waste disposal and safety involves suitable technological 
solutions and communication, able to achieve social consensus. Therefore, an 
energy policy which includes the use of nuclear power among its energy sources 
will have to handle three problems: overcoming the scarcity of public funds, 
choosing the best nuclear technology available, and finally conducting a cost-
benefit analysis to compare nuclear with others renewable sources [7].  
In liberalized markets investments are profit motivated, with the choice of 
technology left to the market. The redistribution of risk among the different 
stakeholders is likely to make nuclear generation unattractive for an investor, even 
when its levelized costs are similar to the levelized costs of the dominant 
technology, for several reasons. 
First, investors have a strong preference for a shorter payback period, which 
makes investments with short lead time more attractive. Nuclear lead times (5 
years in the most optimistic scenario given the historical record) are, for 
engineering and licensing reasons, much longer than CCGT lead times (2 years). 
5.1 The challenge of financing nuclear power 
With its capital intensity and cautionary experiences of engineering 
difficulties and regulatory creep during construction, new nuclear build is likely to 
require a substantial risk premium over competing technologies.  
Given all these challenges to new nuclear build, what explains the 2004 
decision to build a new nuclear power unit in Finland? The large capital costs of the 
plant have been financed by very long-term power purchase agreements. Interest in 
such long-term agreements, which are rare in liberalized markets, has been 
triggered by the specificities of local industries that have very long investment 
cycles and are extremely sensitive to the price of electricity. The Finnish electricity 
company Teollisuuden Voima Oy (TVO) is a cooperative grouping of local utilities 
and large industrial consumers, which are mainly paper makers with a very long 
investment cycle (over 40 years). Each shareholder will enjoy electricity at 
production cost during the life of the plant (60 years), i.e. at a very stable price, in 
proportion to its share, as well as holding a useful option on the future carbon price. 
These long-term power purchase agreements enabled financing at low cost, 
which substantially improves nuclear economics. The Finnish case is therefore in 
many ways reminiscent of the institutional environment that made nuclear a 
competitive technology in the days of regulated monopoly (at least for certain fuel 
price configurations), through the transfer of investment and operation risks to 
consumers via contractual arrangements. 
The Finnish example reminds us that low discount rates are obtainable in 
liberalized markets when the risks have been adequately mitigated, in this case by 
very long-term effectively fixed price power purchase agreements with large, credit-
worthy consumers who necessarily (given their involvement in the forest industry) 
must take a very long-term outlook. It is not impossible to identify such consumers 
in other liberalized markets, but the dominant assumption is that electricity 
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consumers are generally uninterested in hedging their risk exposure to electricity 
price fluctuations.  
Vertically integrated companies with both generation and retailing can 
effectively internalise the risk of wholesale power price volatility without an explicit 
contract, and are thus well placed to hedge wholesale price risks.  
5.2 The potential financial benefits of nuclear power 
There are potentially two attributes of nuclear power generation that could 
make it more appealing to investors. First, nuclear generation costs are insensitive 
to both gas and carbon prices (as are most renewables). Therefore, rising gas prices 
and carbon trading or carbon taxes will make nuclear more competitive against 
CCGTs and coal-fired plants. Second, investing in nuclear can be thought as a 
hedge against the volatility and risk of gas and carbon prices for a (large) 
generating company. The uncertainty over the evolution of gas and carbon prices 
implies that there is an option value associated with being able to choose between 
nuclear power and other fossil fuel technologies in the future. Moreover, the 
hedging value of a nuclear power investment to a company is not restricted to the 
insensitivity of this plant to gas and carbon price risks. For a company already 
operating some fossil fuel generation plants, investing in a nuclear plant reduces 
the company’s overall exposure to fossil fuel and gas prices. 
While most valuation studies of competitive generation technologies take 
account of different gas and carbon prices through sensitivity analysis, as far as the 
authors know, there is no published study valuing nuclear as a hedge against 
uncertain gas and carbon prices from a company perspective. Assessing the 
economics of a nuclear or CCGT power plant investment from a company 
perspective requires taking into account the complementarity of the risk-returns 
profiles of the different technologies that the company operates.  
 
6 INVESTMENT IN ELECTRICITY GENERATION - THE UNCERTAIN 
FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC FUTURE 
If nuclear power is relevant to future energy needs, several factors must be 
taken into account. While electric growth in developed countries has been very low 
over the last decade, there is no assurance that this trend will continue. Even 
growth that is quite modest by historical standards would mandate new plants. 
Replacement of aging plants will call for still more new generating capacity.  
In addition to the slowdown in electric load growth, power plants also have 
been cancelled and deferred due to the widely acknowledged deterioration in the 
financial condition of utilities. 
Looking ahead, the prospects for substantial numbers of new central station 
power plants appear fairly uncertain. The prospects for more nuclear plants appear 
even more uncertain.  
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The ratio between electricity growth rates and GDP growth rates has indeed 
dropped. 
Future growth of GDP is a major source of uncertainty, both because income 
and industrial production are assumed by economists to have major impacts on 
electricity demand, and because of some deep uncertainties about the future 
direction of the economy. Even the fairly narrow range of GDP growth rates of 2 to 
3 percent that has been assumed by the major electricity demand projections 
implies a range of electricity demand growth rates of about 2 to 3 percent over the 
long run if electricity demand follows the income response patterns identified in 
recent the past. 
Future electricity prices and their impacts are a second source of uncertainty 
about electricity demand growth. This is both because there is disagreement about 
future change in electricity prices and because there is uncertainty about how 
electricity demand responds to electricity prices. 
There is generally less agreement about the impact of electricity prices on 
electricity demand than there is about the impact of changes in GDP. Most analysts 
agree that the short-run response of electricity demand to an increase in electricity 
prices is very limited. 
The combined effect of uncertainty about future electricity and natural gas 
(and oil) prices and uncertainty about how electricity demand responds to changes 
in electricity prices is enough to explain a range of uncertainty in electricity 
demand from very slow growth to quite rapid growth. 
Power companies' executives contemplating the construction of long lead time 
power plants must contend with considerable uncertainty about the probable future 
growth rates in electricity demand. 
In summary - the need for new power plants depends on both the growth 
rates in electricity demand and on the need for replacement of existing generating 
capacity. 
 
7 NUCLEAR POWER GENERATION: COST–BENEFIT ANALYSIS 
UNDER UNCERTAINTY 
Few years ago started so called nuclear renaissance that could be attributed 
to: 
• An extremely strong record of global nuclear operations, with no high-profile 
incidents, for over two decades helped shift the perceptions about the 
environment and health risks of the nuclear energy. 
• There was a fading memory of the Three Mile Island and Chernobyl 
accidents. 
• High volatility in the fossil fuel prices called for an increased diversity in 
electricity generation, and  
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• Increased public concern over the greenhouse gas emissions meant that 
nuclear energy was one of the leading candidates to shoulder the increased 
future energy demands. 
The events in Fukushima however derailed the onset of a nuclear renaissance 
with the focus back on the safety of NPP. These events are likely to cause major 
regulatory changes thus further increasing the uncertainties in already uncertain 
economics of the nuclear industry. It can be argued that the nuclear renaissance 
began faltering even before the unfolding of events at Fukushima. This was due to 
the concerns over the large risks and uncertainties underlying the cost elements of 
nuclear power. These risks and uncertainties were reflected in the wide range of 
cost estimates for nuclear power plants. The cost overruns and schedule delays of 
Finland’s new Olkiluoto plant and France’s Flamenville plant are rekindling old 
fears about nuclear power being far too complex and costly. This raises new 
questions about the viability of new nuclear plants, especially in deregulated 
electricity markets. 
Negative wholesale prices have become more common as European countries 
turn to renewables, particularly Germany with its forced march away from nuclear 
power, known as the Energiewende. Neighbours such as Poland and the Czech 
Republic complain that power surges from Germany are playing havoc with their 
grids [8]. Across Europe a strange consequence of subsidised renewables is that 
some governments now want to pay power companies to maintain the capacity to 
produce electricity from fossil fuels to ensure that backup power is available. More 
perversely, Europe is burning more heavily polluting coal at the expense of cleaner 
and more flexible gas. This is because coal is cheap, the gas market is far from 
liquid and the carbon-emissions systems broken [8]. Therefore, in the longer term, 
increasing concerns about the CO2 emissions added to the need for electricity in 
bulk without intermittency may imply stronger prospects for nuclear power. The 
future of nuclear power depends on resolving the issues of safety of operations, safe 
management of radioactive wastes and measures to prevent proliferation [9]. 
However, in a deregulated electricity market, the economics of NPPs will also be an 
important determinant of nuclear energy’s role in the future global energy mix.  
Current electricity price on Power Exchanges (Figure 2 show recent prices of 
electricity and CO2 allowances on EEX and HUPX power exchange and base price 
for next year) are so low that no new Power plant can be competitive on electricity 
market and that almost all investment will be in renewable energy sources because 
of support schemes (feed-in tariffs or Green certificates). 
New nuclear generating capacity would give rise to direct costs as well as a 
range of external costs and benefits. These would call for the valuation of the 
following: 
• environmental benefits - reduced GHG emissions to be gained from adding 
nuclear rather than coal- or gas-fired generating capacity; 
• fuel mix diversification value of nuclear power as a hedge against uncertain 
fossil fuel and carbon prices; 
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• costs of radioactive waste disposal; 
• risks associated with radioactivity release from all fuel cycle activity; 
• risks of proliferation from the nuclear fuel cycle; and 
• financial liabilities arising from the back-end activities of the nuclear fuel 
cycle-e.g., decommissioning and waste management. 
It must be stated at the outset that it is difficult to quantify the costs and 
risks related to nuclear safety and especially to nuclear proliferation. It should also 
be noted that the original risk analysis of nuclear power might have 
underestimated the true probability of reactor meltdown. And while modern 
reactors are claimed to achieve a very low risk of serious accidents, this needs to be 





Figure 2 Market prices of electricity and CO2 on EEX (Phelix) and HUPX 
EEX electricity base price EUR/MWh
EEX: Auction - Phelix SPOT 
EEX: EU Emission Allowances Phelix Power Futures - EEX Power 
Derivatives – Cal 20 BASE
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8 ALTERNATIVE CONTRACTING AND OWNERSHIP PRACTICES FOR 
NEW NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS 
Innovative financing techniques have been investigated to disentangle the 
high construction risks from the lower operation risks of new nuclear build. 
Whether it involves project finance or corporate finance, the financing 
arrangements of a nuclear power plant are likely to involve refinancing once the 
plant has started production.  
Countries embarking on a nuclear program, as well as countries whose 
programs have been dormant for extended periods of time, have expressed a 
number of common challenges that include the availability of the required human 
resources, securing financing, and managing waste. Some alternative contracting 
and ownership schemes, such as Build-Own-Operate (“BOO”), Build-Own-Operate-
Transfer (“BOOT”) models, and regional ownership approaches might address these 
common challenges. These structures have been used in non-nuclear power projects 
and in other industries successfully for decades and although they have been 
discussed within the nuclear industry community, they have not been used for 
nuclear power plants until the recent announcement of the Akkuyu project in 
Turkey.  
8.1 Overview of classical contractual and ownership structures 
Previously, governments have used public sector funds either using tax 
revenue or electricity tariff subsidies to finance nuclear power. This enabled 
transfer of the risks and development costs to a regulated customer base. Whether 
local industry could provide the nuclear technology or whether such technology had 
to be purchased from abroad, the end result traditionally has been that 
owner/operator of the NPP was either government owned and/or regulated through 
the regulated customer base that it serviced.  
However, the recent trend shows that globally governments are increasingly 
looking for investors to finance new infrastructure investments. Prior and current 
development of NPPs has occurred either through sovereign or corporate-based 
structures. This development history is one of leadership by public entities in a 
regulatory environment that enabled transfer of the risks and development costs to 
a regulated customer base. As markets have liberalized there is now less 
opportunity to cover development costs through the regulated customer base. 
Instead, potential NPPs in those regions must be assessed on the strength of the 
underlying economics of the project within a competitive market structure. 
Traditionally, project structures have favoured the presence of a national or 
regional utility that has served as the owner/operator. This owner/operator, either 
on the strength of its own balance sheet or through the support of sovereign funds 
or guarantees, has provided the equity component for these NPPs with debt 
financing (both commercial lending and Export Credit Agency financing). Such 
structures imply that a knowledgeable, well-capitalized entity (most likely, a 
national or regional utility) will serve as the owner/operator as well as develop the 
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project. In many cases this development is with extra-national assistance for the 
nuclear technology via Engineering, Procurement, and Construction (EPC) 
contracts that may include operational assistance as well. 
Historically, nuclear power development occurred either (i) as part of a 
national nuclear power program that has been led by the host government (e.g., 
France, India, the People’s Republic of China), or (ii) by national or regional utility 
companies that have been able to recover project costs through a regulated rate 
base (e.g., the current U.S. nuclear fleet). The following are the three basic NPP 
financing structures: Sovereign-based model, Corporate-based mode, Project-based 
model. 
Figure 3 shows the relationship between the different models relative to risk, 
measured by the following parameters that discuss allocation of risk: 
• Degree of market unbundling and market liberalization: The project model 
scores highest against this parameter, with the sovereign and corporate 
model scoring lower. 
• Amount of risk transferability (from public to private sector): The corporate 
model scores the highest against this parameter, followed by the project 
model, then the sovereign model. 
• Degree of recourse on shareholders: The corporate and sovereign model score 
the highest against this parameter (note the government being viewed as a 
shareholder), followed by the project model. 
Figure 3 Different Contracting Models and Financing Techniques [10] 
8.2 Description of the BOO(T) Concept 
In a BOO or a BOOT structure (Figure 4), a private or non-private whereby 
an entity (called the Developer) is granted the right by the public sector or host 
government to develop, finance, build, own, operate, and maintain a facility for a 
specified period during which the entity owns the project and retains revenue and 
associated risk. Under a BOOT, at the end of the period, ownership of the facility is 
transferred to the host government. BOO and BOOT structures have been used 
successfully in a variety of infrastructure projects, but the Akkuyu project in 
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Turkey is the first in the nuclear industry. Under such structures, the Developer is 
responsible for bringing together project development capabilities, to include: 
technology; engineering, procurement, and construction; fuel supply; operations; 
and financing. As such, these types of contractual arrangements are a package deal 
since all of the project components of developing a nuclear power plant are included. 
Very simply, the BOO(T) structure places the responsibility for delivering the 
project on the Developer.  
Figure 4 Typical structure for a BOO(T) Project [10] 
This is normally achieved by creating a project company, which is a 
cooperative venture between the private and non-private entity, built on the 
expertise of each partner, which best meets clearly defined public needs through the 
appropriate allocation of resources, risks, and rewards. It undertakes the 
development, financing, construction and operation of a facility. 
While Developer concerns will focus, to a large extent, on the linkage between 
the aggregate costs to develop the project and the sale price of electricity (and the 
period over which such price might be guaranteed by the host government), the 
Developer will also look to the many issues in assessing the risks associated with a 
particular project. 
It is important to note that, while a BOO(T) structure could envision a 
situation whereby the licensed operator could be responsible for both spent fuel and 
decommissioning, the host government will have to establish the framework under 
which such tasks are performed. 
 
9 CONCLUSIONS 
The purpose of this paper was to analyse how increased uncertainty affects 
investment projects in the power sector with focus on nuclear power plants. 
Investment timing and technology choice are of principal interest to not only to 
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policy-makers but also to the various market participants. Due to the non-storage 
characteristics of electricity, investments are crucial in order to balance supply with 
future demand expectations and its timing can therefore strongly affect the power 
price. Furthermore, there exist a limited number of alternative technologies 
available for power production. Each technology is associated with different cost 
structures and uncertainties in input price, power price and policy formulations, 
which together with the irreversibility of the investment affect the investment 
behaviour. 
The nuclear power industry is facing a period of extreme uncertainty. The 
conclusion that results from review of many studies worldwide is a uncertain 
scenario about the majority of aspects of nuclear energy development. Nuclear 
development scenarios seem to be associated to higher costs and prices than in 
the past. Shortages in the nuclear supply chain as well as the indefinite state of 
spent fuel worldwide could create additional barriers. Significant uncertainties are 
also linked to environmental impacts (uncertain GHG emission estimates, scarce 
knowledge of the contribution to other impact categories); to financial analysis 
(nuclear investment in competitive market is penalized compared to renewable 
sources and gas-fired generation, as it is characterized by high capital costs, long 
time return on investment and low flexibility; these factors contribute to increase 
the financial and economic risk for investors) as well as to macroeconomic 
analysis (it is uncertain the role that nuclear could have in addressing energy 
security; since gas-fired generation is the major competitor of nuclear in a 
cost-benefit perspective, the potential benefit of new nuclear is strongly affected by 
gas prices, carbon prices and nuclear costs). 
In particular, when "facts are uncertain, values in dispute, stakes high and 
decisions urgent", the concept itself of “feasibility” must be converted from 
“technical and economic feasibility” into a more complex framework, shift from the 
expert community to an "extended peer community" consisting of all those affected 
by an impact who are ready to enter into dialogue on it. They bring in alternate 
points of view, that include local knowledge and expertise not generally 
accounted for in normal scientific reports.  
Now the carbon policy uncertainty has significant impact on power 
generation investments. At the market level, carbon policy uncertainty incentivizes 
excess capacity investment in both fossil and renewable technologies, which over 
long run, given electricity demand is to some degree elastic, can be beneficial for 
both consumers and generating companies. At the economy wide level sufficient 
long run policy stringency and certainty is needed in carbon policy to meet near and 
long term emission reduction targets, with a carbon price of $100/t for carbon 
dioxide equivalent emission or more. 
Despite recent revived interest in nuclear power, the prospects for merchant 
nuclear investment in liberalized industries without government support do not 
seem promising. The reason is relatively simple: quite apart from overcoming any 
regulatory and public opinion difficulties, the economic risks of nuclear power have 
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been adversely affected by liberalization. High capital cost, uncertain construction 
cost, and potential construction and licensing delays are likely to lead private 
investors to require a substantial risk premium over coal and gas fired power 
plants to finance at least the first new nuclear units. Recent cost estimates reveal 
both the large underlying nuclear cost uncertainties and different interpretations 
of the impact of liberalization on the cost of finance and hence investment choices. 
These results imply that there is little private value to merchant generating 
companies in retaining the nuclear option in risky European electricity markets 
with gas and carbon prices.  
Because difficulties for financing new nuclear power plants new financing 
models have been developed like BOO/BOOT structure, Contract for difference in 
UK or "Mankala" model in Finland (whereby a limited liability company is run like 
a zero-profit-making co-operative for the benefit of its shareholders). 
In a BOOT structure, a private or non-private entity is granted the right by 
the public sector to develop, finance, build, own, operate, and maintain a facility for 
a specified period during which the entity owns the project and retains the revenue 
and associated risk. The Developer is the entity that takes the responsibility for 
delivering the project (i.e., commissioning a nuclear power plant). Under a BOOT, 
at the end of the period, ownership of the facility is transferred to the public sector 
or host government. BOO is like BOOT, except the original entity owns the project 
outright and retains the revenue and associated risk in perpetuity [10]. 
Recently on the opposite the U.K. Government clearly accepts that there is a 
social or consumer value in ‘keeping the nuclear option open’ as this has formed a 
part of U.K. government policy [12, 13]. The Finnish experience shows that if well-
informed electricity-intensive end users with long time horizons are willing to sign 
long-term contracts, then nuclear new build can be a realistic option in liberalized 
markets. 
Climate change policies can easily distort market signals, insulating 
renewables generation from market dynamics. This in turn reduces the proportion 
of the market that is effectively opened to competitive forces. When renewable 
support policies are undertaken, investments in conventional technologies suffer 
(especially in capital intensive investment like in nuclear power plant). This 
produces distorting effects on the generation mix. Policy intervention, rather than 
market forces, is able to select artificially winners and losers, thus potentially 
undermining, in the long run, the necessary diversity of the energy mix. 
Carbon policy uncertainty has significant impact on power generation 
investments and that these impacts can be different depending on which level of 
investment decision making is being considered. At the firm level, carbon policy 
uncertainty creates path dependency in resources acquisition with the result that 
new investment decisions depend on the existing power generation assets and how 
they interact with the carbon policy risk. 
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At the market level, carbon policy uncertainty incentivizes excess capacity 
investment in both fossil and renewable technologies, which over long run, given 
electricity demand is to some degree elastic, can be beneficial for both consumers 
and generating firms. At the economy wide level, our results show that sufficient 
long run policy stringency and certainty is needed in carbon policy to meet near and 
long term emission reduction targets, with a carbon price of $100/t for carbon 
dioxide equivalent emission or more. 
Currently nuclear power plants present too many financial risks as a result of 
uncertainties in electricity market, electric demand growth, very high capital costs, 
operating problems, increasing regulatory requirements, and growing public 
opposition. However, enough utilities have built and building nuclear reactors 
within acceptable cost limits, and operated them safely and reliably to demonstrate 
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